Independent research · 2015–2026
Cyberattacks and infrastructure failures are growing. So is the machinery meant to contain them. This study measures both sides — and finds that defense isn't just slow. It's pointed at the wrong target.
The question
Over the past few years, one failure after another — a data-center fire that took a nation's chat app offline, a telecom breach exposing 23 million people, a ransomware attack that locked students out of their coursework mid-finals — cut off services millions rely on. The obvious question is whether attacks are rising. The harder one, and the one this study asks: has our ability to defend kept pace? Answering it means measuring both sides — the pressure, and the capacity built to absorb it.
Four measures · three of pressure, one of capacity
How often incidents happen — and how much of the recent spike is real versus a change in how incidents get counted.
How much of the world's infrastructure now rests on a handful of providers — the blast radius of any single failure.
When one platform breaks, how many industries go down with it — and whether that reach is widening.
How fast, and how far, regulators and firms respond — traced across six matched incident-to-response pairs.
The through-line
The two widest cascades in the study — MOVEit and CrowdStrike, hitting eight and seven of eight sectors — produced no new binding rule. The narrowest did. Regulation doesn't track how far a failure spreads. It tracks whether personal data leaked inside a sector a regulator already polices.
The two widest cascades in the study ran through single vendors — CrowdStrike's update pipeline and Progress's MOVEit platform — reaching banking, healthcare, aviation, government, and education at once.
The framework
The whole study reads through one idea, the efficiency–fragility tradeoff: the same design choices that make digital systems cheaper and faster also make them more fragile. Moving everyone's services onto a few cloud providers cuts costs — but it means a single break can take down far more than before. Fragility isn't the price you pay to get efficiency. It's part of what efficiency is.
That idea predicts exactly what the capacity analysis finds. Concentration is not a flaw any single company can be cited for, so a regulatory system built to police data breaches simply can't see it. The pressure grows along one axis — structure. The defense is lined up along another — confidentiality. And the two never meet.
Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies (Basic Books, 1984) — the source of the tight-coupling framework this study builds on.